The economic changes associated with globalization tighten financial pressures on governments of high-income countries by increasing the demand for government spending while making it more costly to raise tax revenue. Greater international mobility of economic activity, and associated responsiveness of the tax base to tax rates, increase the economic distortions created by taxation.
I. Introduction
There is a discomfort current in high-income countries, as governments face excess demand for the services they provide together with difficulty raising revenue needed to finance greater expenditures or even to maintain services at levels to which their populations have grown accustomed. The mismatch of desires and means is an old and common story, hardly unique to governments, and not any easier for its banality. Changing world economic conditions, the globalization of production and markets, and the economic awakening of much of the world's population have contributed to the problems confronting governments of affluent countries even as they have made possible some of the most exciting developments of modern times.
Economic theory offers insights chiefly into the dire consequences of possible methods that governments might use to address their financial difficulties. Efforts to tax mobile economic activity stimulate mobility and thereby create economic distortions as business activities, capital, and labor are reallocated for tax rather than productivity reasons. Sophisticated tax avoidance through financial and other means reduces the revenue potential of high rates of income taxation and further contributes to the economic cost of taxation. Taxes on capital income distort the intertemporal allocation of consumption due to the compounding of effective tax rates over time. And redistributive taxation that subjects income to high marginal rates of effective taxation creates its own economic distortions.
The economic costs of raising tax revenue are particularly worrisome in an environment in which governments face significant demands on their resources. Despite the greater general affluence associated with globalization, some segments of industrial societies, particularly those relying on returns to less skilled labor, may be adversely affected by resulting price changes. The accompanying social dislocations put pressures on governments to soften the impact of global economic changes 1 and, if possible, respond in ways that help their populations thrive in more globally competitive markets. Social welfare programs for many years have served the first of these functions and education and training programs the second; they are all expensive, so there is understandable interest in the ability of governments to maintain their funding in an era in which most large countries have open economies.
One of the potential challenges for governments that are eager to maintain and possibly strengthen their spending programs is that the same forces that are responsible for recent economic changes might also raise the cost of financing government programs with certain types of taxes. The relative ease of international trade, capital movement, and communication makes it possible for production to locate in many places around the world and for tax burdens to be avoided through international transactions. Since location choices, activity levels, and taxable incomes are sensitive to local tax rates, it stands to reason that governments would feel intensifying international pressure to reduce tax burdens on business activities, investors, and possibly high net worth individuals. If tax rates fall without other compensating changes, then government tax revenues will decline, and with them government expenditures. A general reduction in government expenditures entails reduced outlays on social welfare and education programs, particularly since there are no countervailing international pressures on governments to maintain this spending. 2 How then can governments find revenues to finance social spending and other programs without creating enormous economic distortions? Distortions are minimized by taxing bases that are least responsive to taxation. Land is the classic example of a factor inelastic in supply and therefore nondistortionary to tax, though taxing land raises other issues and in any case modern governments require far more revenue than is feasible to obtain from land taxes alone.
A good part of the problem facing governments is the mobility and potential mobility of economic activity. Some aspects of this mobility are clearly observable, taking the form of foreign direct investment by multinational firms, portfolio investment by individuals and financial institutions, international trade, immigration of individuals, international licensing of intangible property, and other forms of international factor mobility. Other features of mobility are more subtle, taking the form of businesses that thrive in locations that heretofore would not have been suitable for them, workforces that need not move because markets come to them, and ideas that are adopted everywhere. In the absence of coordinated government policies, the potential mobility of economic activity makes it extremely difficult for governments to exploit monopoly positions over much of their tax bases, thereby greatly contributing to the distortions created in the course of raising tax revenue.
The behavior of governments during the era of globalization offers clues to the likely course of future developments. Small countries with their relatively more open economies have always faced greater international pressures than large countries, and their fiscal systems therefore had to adapt earlier than large countries to the greater mobility that open markets create. Globalization means that in some sense all countries are becoming smaller. In order to explore the likely consequences for large countries of globalizing trends, it is therefore useful to consider the tax policies that small countries use and, in particular, the way in which their tax policies have differed from those in larger countries.
The evidence indicates that small countries rely much less than other countries do on income taxes imposed on individuals and corporations. While small and more open economies certainly use income taxes, their governments rely much less on these taxes than they do on expendituretype taxes such as excise, sales, and value-added taxes as well as tariffs on imported goods. The cross-sectional evidence for 1999 is that a 10% smaller national population is associated with a 1% lower ratio of income taxes to total tax revenue, and panel evidence points to even stronger effects of changes in country size on the use of income taxes.
Expenditure-type taxes have risen in popularity everywhere in the world, as reflected in the fact that more than 130 countries now impose significant value-added taxes, and there is widespread reliance on excise taxes on gasoline and other commodities. The popularity of expenditure taxes is due in part to their administrative and enforcement features and in part to their efficiency properties. In a globalizing world, expenditures have relatively clear geographic associations, reducing the potential for international tax avoidance and generally reducing the mobility of the tax base compared to alternatives such as personal income taxes or source-based business taxes including the corporate income tax. Expenditure taxes do not directly tax capital returns, but do so indirectly by taxing all returns when spent on goods and services, which has the effect of taxing pure profits on capital investments while effectively exempting normal returns to saving.
Heavy use of expenditure taxation in place of income taxation can carry serious implications for tax progressivity, since in practice many expenditure taxes have flat rates that make them much less progressive than income tax alternatives. Absence of tax progressivity is not intrinsic to taxing expenditures, since it is possible to tax lightly goods purchased disproportionately by low-income families, though there are serious limits to the amount of redistribution that can be achieved that way (see, e.g., the analysis in Sah [1983] ). It is possible to couple the adoption of new expenditure taxes with offsetting distributional changes in income taxation, as proposed by Graetz (2002) and others, though there are realistic questions about whether countries in practice are capable of enacting such sweeping reforms. Furthermore, there are serious proposals to institute progressive expenditure-type taxes, which could be implemented by countries such as the United States through relatively minor adjustments to existing taxes. In the absence of compensating adjustment to other taxes and expenditures, however, the most likely outcome of greater reliance on expenditure-type taxation is reduced overall fiscal progressivity. Given recent changes in income distributions, governments may be dissatisfied with such an outcome and seek creative alternatives that permit fiscal progressivity to accompany sufficient revenue generation. 2005 . By just about any measure, income has become significantly less evenly distributed in the United States over the past 3 decades. There is considerable controversy over the extent to which changes to income distributions in wealthy countries can be attributed to the growth of international trade and investment, though the evidence reviewed by Feenstra and Hanson (2004) strongly suggests that globalization has contributed significantly to income inequality.
II. Tax Policy Pressures on the United States
The changing income distribution creates demands for the U.S. government to improve the economic prospects of the disadvantaged with education, training, and other programs and to modify the after-tax distribution of income through the tax and transfer system. Creating meaningful new national economic opportunities with education and training programs requires significant expenditures that entail substantial new financing sources, typically in the form of higher taxes. Redistributing income through the tax system also requires high tax rates, including not only taxes on affluent individuals and families but high implicit tax rates on means-tested transfers to low-income individuals and families.
Perhaps the most significant sectoral shift of modern times is the rising fraction of national resources devoted to health spending. The government is heavily involved in all matters concerning health, so rising health costs together with limits to the ability of private individuals and their employers to finance adequate health coverage put enormous potential burdens on governments to make up any differences. Significantly increased public spending on health care requires greater resources for all levels of government. In addition, rising per capita private health care costs contribute to financial burdens on private individuals, particularly those without access to generous employer-provided health insurance. This, in turn, adds to the demand for public support of low-income individuals and families.
Changes to the distribution of income and rising health care expenditures are just two of several trends that contribute to U.S. government revenue needs in the coming years. An aging population requires greater spending on public pensions, including social security and disability insurance, and an aging public infrastructure creates significant needs for greater spending on roads and highways, sewer systems, port and airport facilities, telecommunications, and other elements of public infrastructure. At the same time that the U.S. government faces greater expenditure demands, its ability to finance expenditures is limited by greater mobility of the tax base and competition from other parts of the world for mobile economic activity.
Rising levels of worldwide foreign direct investment have the potential to trigger rounds of competitive business tax reductions, as countries seek to attract the employment opportunities, productivity spillovers, and other economic benefits commonly associated with greater investment, particularly foreign investment. Countries have incentives to reduce business tax rates if they believe that lower tax rates will be associated with greater economic activity, a higher tax base, or both. While evidence of growing foreign direct investment does not by itself demonstrate that tax policies influence the magnitude and performance of international investment, there is ample separate evidence that they do.
A substantial body of research considers how taxation influences the activities of multinational firms. 4 This literature considers the effects of taxation on investment and on tax avoidance activities. With respect to investment, tax policies are obviously capable of affecting the volume and location of foreign direct investment since, all other considerations equal, higher tax rates reduce after-tax returns, thereby reducing incentives to commit investment funds. This literature identifies the effects of taxes through time-series estimation of the responsiveness of foreign direct investment to annual variation in after-tax rates of return and cross-sectional studies that exploit the large differences in corporate tax rates around the world to identify the effects of taxes on foreign direct investment. The first generation of these studies, reviewed in Hines (1997 Hines ( , 1999 , reports tax elasticities of investment in the neighborhood of −0.6. What this means is that a 10% tax reduction (e.g., reducing the corporate tax rate from 35% to 31.5%) should be associated with 6% greater inbound foreign investment. More recent evidence suggests that foreign direct investment is even more tax sensitive than this.
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Contractual arrangements between related parties located in countries with different tax rates offer numerous possibilities for sophisticated tax avoidance. It is widely suspected that firms select transfer prices used for within-firm transactions with the goal of reducing their total tax obligations. Multinational firms typically can benefit by reducing prices charged by affiliates in high-tax countries for items and services provided to affiliates in low-tax countries. OECD governments require firms to use transfer prices that would be paid by unrelated parties, but enforcement is difficult, particularly when pricing issues concern differentiated or proprietary items such as patent rights. Given the looseness of the resulting legal restrictions, it is entirely possible for firms to adjust transfer prices in a tax-sensitive fashion without violating any laws. Multinational firms can structure a variety of transactions-intrafirm debt, royalty payments, dividend repatriations, and intrafirm trade-in a manner that is conducive to tax avoidance. Studies of the responsiveness of firms to taxes on these margins examine reported profitabilities, tax liabilities, and specific measures of financial and merchandise trade in order to identify the effects of taxes.
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Taken together, this evidence implies that the volume of foreign direct investment, and accompanying economic activity and corporate tax bases, is highly responsive to local tax policies. It follows that countries contemplating lowering their corporate income tax rates can reasonably expect to receive significantly greater foreign investment as a consequence. Active tax avoidance on the part of international investors implies that taxable income conditional on investment levels also responds strongly to tax rate changes. The combination of these two effects reduces the budgetary cost to a single country that reduces its tax rate need not be very great, since a lower tax rate is accompanied by a larger tax base due both to greater investment and to greater taxable income associated with local investment. The incentive to reduce corporate tax rates in order to attract foreign direct investment has increased since the early 1980s, as levels of world foreign direct investment rose sharply during that time.
III. Economic Globalization and Tax Competition
It stands to reason that countries eager to attract tax bases might compete with each other by reducing tax rates, as a result of which taxes, and therefore government expenditures, are driven to inefficiently low levels. The likelihood of such an outcome depends on the tax instruments available to governments and the nature of the competitive environment. In order to evaluate this prospect, it is helpful to consider the incentives that countries face. Our understanding of the tax rate implications of international capital mobility dates to Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) , who demonstrate that efficient taxation in a small open economy entails zero taxation of income earned by foreign investors. The explanation for their result is that any positive taxation distorts the economy more than other tax alternatives would, without shifting any of the tax burden to foreign investors. 7 If international capital flows are increasingly sensitive to tax rate differences, then incentives to reduce tax rates are presumably rising as well. The analysis also implies that countries that nevertheless persist in taxing income earned by foreign investors will have lower incomes than those that do not. The Diamond and Mirrlees result is commonly thought to imply that small countries have the least to gain from attempting to impose taxes on investment. Small countries are believed to face the most elastic corporate tax bases and therefore to have the strongest incentives to offer low corporate tax rates, despite possible mitigating factors such as strategic behavior and distortions induced by other policies. While there are few tests of the proposition that the supply of capital to small countries is more elastic than the supply of capital to large countries, this is more than a matter of faith since, in most models, it follows as an implication of their relatively small domestic business tax bases (see, e.g., Bucovetsky 1991) . Whether countries actually design their policies on the basis of these presumed elasticities is another matter.
Larger countries have stronger incentives to tax foreign investors since they are able to extract some rents by virtue of the fact that prices in their economies need not respond to tax policies in a way that maintains unchanged the investors' after-tax profit margins. Possibly weighing against this is strategic competition among large countries, whose tax policies may be designed in a way that reflects their likely effects on the policies of other countries. Another consideration is that the inability to tailor tax and other policies perfectly might change efficient levels of taxation from what they would be in the absence of other distortions. For example, trade barriers may distort local prices and thereby influence the efficient taxation of foreign direct investment. If countries are unable to impose corrective taxes or subsidies on externality-producing activities of corporations, then modifications to corporate income tax rates might serve as indirect remedies. Similarly, if personal income taxation cannot be tailored to achieve efficient redistribution, then there may be circumstances in which efficient third-best tax policies might include distortionary corporate taxes. Finally, large countries might have personal income tax rates that differ from those in small countries. Efforts to align top personal and corporate tax rates in order to prevent tax arbitrage would then produce correlations between corporate tax rates and country sizes that stem from the determinants of personal income tax rates rather than efficient taxation of inbound foreign investment.
Several country-specific considerations therefore affect the consequences of taxing internationally mobile capital. It is noteworthy that, even in the absence of special considerations, international tax competition may produce outcomes in which capital taxes are higher than they would be in the absence of competition. This can happen when there is foreign ownership of productive factors, when competing countries differ greatly in size, or when multiple governments attempt to tax the same income sources.
The case of foreign ownership is clear: governments that care only about the welfare of domestic residents have incentives to adopt policies that enrich residents at the expense of foreigners. Foreign ownership of local firms may encourage governments to raise local capital tax rates above the levels they would impose in the absence of economic openness, since much of the tax burden is borne by owners to whom the taxing government is largely indifferent. Even foreign ownership of local land may trigger higher corporate tax rates if the burden of corporate taxes is in part borne by landowners in the form of lower prices. Finally, governments may have incentives to overtax the foreign earnings of domestic companies, since doing so discourages foreign investment and thereby directs resources to the home economy, a valuable exchange in the presence of tax or other distortions. 8 If all governments respond to these incentives, then the result is that capital can be overtaxed in equilibrium.
Competition among countries of differing sizes creates incentives for jurisdictions to choose tax policies strategically to manipulate international prices to their own advantage. As DePater and Myers (1994) note, large capital-importing countries have incentives to tax capital heavily in order to reduce capital demand and therefore depress the world price of capital that domestic importers must pay. By the same reasoning, capitalexporting countries have incentives to subsidize capital investment in order to raise prices; but if the exporting countries are smaller than the importers, it may not be in the interest of any individual exporter acting on its own to offer such subsidies. The result is that international tax competition produces higher average capital tax rates than in the absence of competition.
What is the likely impact of tax competition on tax rates and government revenues? In a simple setting of symmetric countries, no special considerations or distortions, no foreign ownership, and governments that must finance all their expenditures with capital income taxation, Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991) confirm that international competition reduces government revenue and expenditures below efficient levels that would be chosen in the absence of competition. Oates and Schwab (1988) note that this conclusion depends critically on the assumption that governments do not have access to revenue sources other than capital income taxes, since the availability of nondistortionary alternatives eliminates any impact of capital taxes on government spending levels. Since governments rely on many revenue sources other than capital income taxes, since foreign ownership is common, countries differ in size, and tax policies are often used to correct economic distortions that cannot be more easily addressed some other way, it is possible for greater international economic mobility not to depress total government revenues.
Governments unable to raise significant amounts of revenue by taxing mobile business income may be able to use other taxes, but the revenue potentials of some alternatives to business taxes are to a lesser degree also limited by international considerations. In the case of personal income taxes, the ability to use international financial transactions may facilitate tax avoidance by high-income taxpayers, and international mobility of individuals and their earnings increases the mobility of the personal income tax base.
9 Furthermore, downward pressure on business tax rates created by international competition is likely to exert downward pressure on top personal income tax rates also, because of the ability of taxpayers to select the forms of business organization. Top personal income tax rates that greatly exceed top corporate income tax rates create incentives for individuals to create corporations financed with personal investments that effectively convert personal income into corporate income, thereby undermining the revenue potential of high personal tax rates and in the process inefficiently directing their investments (Gordon and Mackie-Mason 1995) . In response to this possibility, many governments are loath to introduce significant distinctions between top personal and business tax rates. Taxing personal income entails taxing the returns to capital, which in turn reduces incentives to save and invest. The modern theory of capital accumulation notes that the imposition of capital income taxes creates inefficiencies by introducing growing tax wedges between consumption early in life and consumption many years later. 10 The inefficiencies associated with taxing capital income are in no way mitigated, and are quite possibly increased, by the availability of international capital markets that make the supply of capital investment opportunities close to perfectly elastic. 11 Consequently, greater access to world capital markets increases the efficiency costs associated with income taxation.
IV. World Patterns
The United States has a smaller government than many of its peer nations in the OECD, and the composition of U.S. tax revenues likewise differs significantly from those of other countries. Table 3 presents OECD data on government finances of OECD countries in 2004. In that year U.S. tax revenues were 25.5% of GDP, significantly lower than the OECD average of 35.9% and the E.U. average of 39.7%. Personal income taxes accounted for 34.7% of U.S. tax receipts, significantly higher than the OECD average of 24.6%. The United States raised 8.7% of its total tax receipts from corporate income taxes, a shade lower than the OECD average of 9.6%, but raised only 18.3% of total tax revenue from taxes on goods and services, compared with 32.3% for OECD countries as a whole. A major reason that the United States relies so much less than other countries do on taxing goods and services is that, alone among OECD nations, the United States does not have a value-added tax, which is a sophisticated form of a sales tax. For most of the world the major tax event of the late twentieth century is the widespread adoption of valueadded taxes. Whereas by 1966 only two countries had introduced valueadded taxes, by 1985, 35 countries had done so, and in 2004, 134 countries collected significant tax revenue with value-added taxes. Every OECD country other than the United States taxes value-added, at rates that average 17.7%, and that range from Denmark, Hungary, and Sweden at the high end imposing 25% value-added tax rates to Japan, Canada, and Switzerland at the low end all using value-added tax rates in the 5.0-7.5% range. Table 4 presents information on top personal and corporate tax rates among OECD countries in 2004. The U.S. top personal tax rate of 41.4% is almost identical to the OECD average of 41.3%, though the U.S. corporate tax rate of 39.3% is the highest among OECD countries, significantly exceeding the OECD average of 29.8%. By the OECD's calculations, the U.S. tax burden on an average production worker reduces disposable income to 76.6% of take-home pay for single individuals and 95.5% of income for families with two children, in both cases representing smaller tax burdens than the OECD average.
A. Income Taxes
The United States is typical among large countries in relying heavily on personal income taxes and corporate income taxes to finance government expenditures. Figure 1 presents information from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Government Finance Statistics on fractions of total national tax revenue accounted for by the sum of personal income taxes and corporate income taxes. The top panel of figure 1 presents two loci: the triangles represent averages for the quarter of the sample of countries with the smallest populations, and the squares represent averages for the quarter of the sample of countries with the largest populations. This is an unbalanced panel, since country coverage in the IMF data varies a bit from year to year; and to a lesser degree, differential population growth rates change the identities of the largest and smallest countries over time. It is clear from the bottom panel of figure 1 that large countries rely most heavily on income taxes. In a typical early year, such as 1972, the average large country drew 41.6% of its total tax revenue from personal and corporate income taxes, whereas the comparable figure for the average small country was 34.5%. These differences have not narrowed over time: by 2003, income taxes accounted for 43.9% of tax revenue in large countries and only 27.5% of revenue in small countries.
One of the difficulties of interpreting the information in the top panel of figure 1 is that the composition of large and small countries in the sample changes over time as populations change and IMF data availability fluctuates. The bottom panel of figure 1 presents the same information for a balanced panel of countries between 1973 and 2001, a span of time over which the IMF data are most plentiful. Countries in this sample are assigned to the top size quartile and bottom size quartile on the basis of their 1973 populations. As is evident from the figure, differences in the extent to which small and large countries rely on personal income taxes have increased over time. In 1973 the larger countries in this sample raised an average of 41.5% of their tax revenue from personal and corporate income taxes, whereas smaller countries raised only 31.2% of their tax revenue from income taxes. By 2001, larger countries relied on personal and corporate income taxes for 48.9% of their tax revenues, and smaller countries relied on income taxes for 29.9%.
The reason to distinguish countries by size is that economic openness is commonly thought to be a function of country size: there are good reasons to believe that large countries have internal markets that are larger as fractions of their total markets than is the case for smaller countries. The IMF evidence is consistent with this interpretation, since Fig. 1 . Income taxes in small and large countries. The two panels depict the sum of personal and corporate income taxes as fractions of total national tax revenue for samples of small and large countries. the standard measure of economic openness (the ratio of a country 's exports plus imports divided by its GDP) is negatively correlated with country size. Appendix table A1 presents annual cross-sectional correlations between country sizes (as measured by log population) and the standard measure of economic openness; between 1972 and 2006, this correlation varies between −0.32 and −0.22 and is always statistically significant.
It is possible to compare the tax policies of countries with differing degrees of openness, though one of the difficulties of such a comparison is that import and export performance is arguably affected by a country's tax policies and therefore is not entirely appropriate as an independent source of variation. It is nevertheless instructive to consider such a comparison, as presented in figure 2 . The evidence in the top panel of figure 2 is that since the early 1980s, countries with less open economies (as measured by ratios of exports plus imports to GDP) have relied more heavily on income taxes than countries with more open economies. This difference is more pronounced in the balanced panel comparison presented in the bottom panel of figure 2 , where, if anything, the difference between reliance on income taxes by countries with open and closed economies has widened over time.
The IMF data distinguish income tax revenues by personal and corporate taxes, though with spotty coverage and some uncertainty over which revenues are allocated to each category. As a result, any analysis of corporate or personal income taxes in isolation must be treated with some caution. The top panel of figure 3 presents information on differences in the extent to which a balanced panel of large and small countries rely on corporate tax revenue over the 1973-99 period for which data are most plentiful; this evidence illustrates the persistent pattern that smaller countries collect significantly less corporate tax revenue as fractions of total taxes. The bottom panel of figure 3 presents similar information for open and closed economies over the 1975-98 period, with less open economies relying to greater degrees on corporate tax sources. Table 5 presents evidence of the impact of country size and affluence on the extent to which countries rely on personal and corporate income taxes. 12 The table presents six cross-sectional regressions, two for 1973, two for 1985, and two for 1999; the dates were chosen with the goals of covering a wide range of years and also maintaining sizable country coverage for the regressions. The regression in column 1 suggests that larger and more affluent countries may have relied more heavily than other countries on personal and corporate income taxes in 1973, though the estimated coefficients are not statistically significant. In the regression for 1985 presented in column 3, country sizes and levels of affluence have more statistical power in explaining the use of income taxes. The 0.019 coefficient implies that doubling a country's population is associated with a 1.9% higher ratio of income taxes to total tax collections, and the 0.053 coefficient implies that wealthier countries rely more heavily on income taxes. The regressions reported in columns 5 and 6 of table 5 indicate that the effect of country size became stronger by 1999. The 0.051 coefficient in column 5 is very similar to the corresponding 0.053 coefficient in column 3, but the statistically significant 0.042 coefficient in column 5 indicates that doubling a country's population is associated with a 4.2% higher ratio of income taxes to total taxes, corresponding to roughly a 10% greater reliance on income taxes. The regression reported in column 6 reveals that the effects of country size and affluence are concentrated in their interaction: the 0.015 coefficient on the interaction term is large and statistically significant, whereas the estimated coefficients It is possible to use the panel nature of the data to identify the impact of changes in population and income levels on the use of personal and corporate income taxes. The panel estimates include country and year fixed effects, which absorb the impact of persistent differences between countries and common effects of changes over time. In estimating these relationships in a panel framework, it is necessary to normalize for the persistent increases in population and income levels that characterize the experience of most countries between 1972 and 2006. In the panel regressions that follow, the log income, log population, and interaction of log income and log population variables are normalized by dividing them by annual means of these variables, as a result of which the means of the regression variables are (by construction) one in each year (and for the sample as a whole). Table 6 presents panel estimates of the determinants of personal and corporate income tax collections as a fraction of total taxes. These regressions include year and country fixed effects and represent an unbalanced panel, in that not every country is included every year.
13 At a first look the evidence in column 1 of table 6 gives a rather different impression than the cross-sectional regressions in table 5. As in the cross-sectional regressions, higher income levels are associated with greater use of personal income taxes, the 0.257 coefficient in column 1 implying that doubling a country's income level is associated with a 25.7% higher ratio of personal taxes to total taxes. The striking −2.985 coefficient in the same column, however, implies that high levels of national population growth are associated with reduced use of personal income taxes. Introduction of a variable capturing the interaction of country size and affluence in the regression reported in column 2 changes these results rather little. One question raised by these regression results is the extent to which the effects of income and population may change over the 1972-2006 time period. The regression reported in column 3 introduces additional variables that interact starting (1972) population and income levels with time, where time is a variable taking the value one in 1972 and 35 in 2006. Introduction of these time interaction variables somewhat enhances the estimated size of income effects, as reflected in the 0.418 coefficient in column 3. The 0.011 coefficient on the interaction of time and normalized income indicates that countries that were more affluent in 1972 tended to increase their use of income taxes over the sample period compared to other countries.
Introducing time interactions has a more striking effect on estimated population effects. The estimated coefficient on normalized population is small and insignificant in the regression reported in column 3, whereas the 0.021 coefficient on the interaction of time and initial population indicates that countries with small populations in 1972 relied to declining degrees on income taxes over time. Introducing interactions between population and income in the regression reported in column 4 reveals that wealthy large countries made greater use of income taxes over time, as reflected in the estimated 0.052 coefficient. 
B. Expenditure Taxes
Figure 4 presents ratios of expenditure taxes-the sum of indirect taxes on goods and services and international trade taxes (chiefly tariffs)-to total tax revenue. It is evident from both the unbalanced and balanced panels displayed in figure 4 that small countries finance much more of their governments through expenditure taxes than large countries do. The information in the lower panel of figure 4 suggests that differences related to country sizes have not fallen over time, but instead remain quite substantial.
14 Figure 5 compares the use of expenditure taxes by countries with more and less open economies. The evidence presented in the top panel of figure 5 suggests that more open economies have relied relatively heavily on expenditure taxes since the early 1980s, though this was not true prior Table 7 presents evidence that country size and per capita income are consistently associated with smaller ratios of expenditure taxes to total tax revenues. 16 The −0.041 coefficient in column 1 implies that doubling a country's population in 1973 is associated with a 4.1% smaller ratio of expenditure taxes to total tax revenue; and the −0.048 coefficient similarly implies that doubling a country's per capita income is associated with a 4.8% smaller ratio of expenditure taxes to total tax revenue. These effects persist in the regressions for 1985 and 1999, presented in columns 3-6 of table 7, indicating that expenditure taxes are most heavily used by small and poor countries. The panel evidence, reported in table 8, is quite consistent with the cross-sectional evidence appearing in table 7. The −0.442 coefficient reported in column 1 implies that growing income levels are associated with reduced reliance on expenditure taxes, and the −1.435 coefficient indicates that population growth is likewise associated with less use of expenditure taxes. Inclusion of an interaction between population and income in the regression reported in column 2 changes these results very little, though the estimated income effect becomes statistically insignificant. And adding interactions between time and initial income and population levels in the regressions reported in columns 3 and 4 again does little to change the implications of the regression reported in column 1, that countries whose populations and income levels grow smaller make greater relative use of expenditure taxes. 
V. Implications
The international evidence indicates that governments of countries with smaller and more open economies rely less on personal and corporate income taxes, and more on expenditure and trade taxes, than other governments do. Doubtless this reflects many aspects of their economic and political situations, including that properly designed expenditure-type taxes (though typically not trade taxes) can create fewer economic distortions than many income taxes. The United States currently taxes personal and corporate income at high rates compared to other countries, particularly given the relatively small size of the U.S. public sector. As the world economy becomes more integrated, the cost of this type of income taxation will grow relative to the cost of expenditure tax alternatives. There has been consistent U.S. resistance to the prospect of introducing extensive expenditure taxation of the type embodied in value-added taxes or reform of the personal income tax that would give it explicit expenditure tax features. One of the political obstacles that a value-added tax or any other broadbased consumption tax must overcome in the United States is the concern, in some circles, that such taxes are too efficient at raising revenue, that they too easily accommodate big government. While there is little in the way of econometric support for the notion that the adoption of a value-added tax encourages government growth (see, e.g., Metcalf 1995) , it is noteworthy that Michigan, the only state in the country to use a value-added tax instead of a corporate income tax, taxed businesses more heavily than any other state during the years in which its value-added tax was in place . In an era in which governments face growing demands for their services and in which other sources of tax revenue confront growing challenges and are increasingly inefficient, it may not be surprising that governments all over the world have come to rely more heavily on expenditure taxes to meet their revenue needs. Distributional issues present some of the greatest challenges of globalization, since growing international trade and investment affect income distributions directly by changing relative prices and indirectly by affecting the range of feasible government policies. In practice many expenditure taxes are considerably less progressive than income tax alternatives, so movement away from income taxation and in the direction of greater expenditure taxation is typically associated with less equal after-tax distributions of income. Governments that are concerned about growing income inequality and that feel pressured to move their tax systems more strongly in the direction of expenditure taxation therefore can be expected to look for progressive alternatives to standard policy choices. Such alternatives may include progressive forms of expenditure taxation and expenditure policies, such as education and training programs, that support income creation by less affluent members of the population.
The fiscal challenges facing governments in the era of globalization are unlikely to be addressed with single answers such as expanded education programs, but instead strategies that include broad ranges of government policy initiatives. International agreements have the potential to play significant roles in these strategies. It is already the case that governments cooperate in international settings such as the World Trade Organization to promote international trade and investment, and bilateral and multilateral tax agreements and initiatives serve the function of facilitating tax enforcement and avoidance of double taxation of international income. Doubtless governments will come to rely more heavily on international agreements in the years to come, but it remains to be seen whether they will accelerate or offset the recent trend in the direction of expenditure taxation. 
